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China, Venezuela:
A Less Perfect Partnership than Chavez Says
Stratfor
Analysis
Infosearch:
José Cadenas
Bureau Chief
USA
Research Dept.
La Nueva Cuba
August 28, 2006
Summary
Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez's announcements of late make it sound like Venezuela
is about to jump completely into China's lap. The truth is considerably
less sensational.
Analysis
Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez announced several deals after his Aug. 22-25 visit to
China. To take Chavez's word for it, China will install a fiber-optic
network in Venezuela and build 20,000 houses in the country by the
end of the year. In the energy sector -- the Venezuelan economy's
real powerhouse -- Venezuela will increase the amount of oil sold
to China to 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) by the end of the year,
500,000 bpd by 2011 and 1.0 million bpd by 2012. (Currently Venezuela
sells China about 150,000 bpd.) Additionally, bilateral cooperation
in agriculture, gold and coal mining, tourism and the developing
of new oil and natural gas fields will blossom. China will also
sell Venezuela 18 oil tankers and 12 oil rigs.
At first, this
Chinese-Venezuelan pairing looks like a match made in heaven. China
consumes about 7.4 million bpd of crude -- 3.6 million bpd of which
needs to be imported -- and is positioning itself to be a long-term
challenger to U.S. hegemony. Venezuela exports about 1.9 million
bpd of crude, mostly to the United States, yet resents anything
that even alludes to the colossus to the north. China has shipyards
but needs someone to bring tankers full of crude to its doorstep;
Venezuela wants to buy tankers, and wants a customer to take its
oil. Venezuelan oil fueling Chinese industry seems like a nice arrangement.
That is, until
one looks at a map.
Venezuela is
located almost precisely opposite of China on the planet, and since
all of Venezuela's export points are in the central Atlantic and
the Panama Canal is unable to transit supertankers, a Venezuelan-Chinese
shipping run would be the single longest shipping route in the world.
Right now China's oil supplies come predominantly from the Middle
East and Africa, making them potentially vulnerable to a number
of possible foes. But oil shipped around South America and then
across the Pacific is vulnerable to U.S. interdiction anywhere along
the way.
Additionally,
Venezuela's crude oil is both viscous and contaminated with a host
of impurities -- heavy and sour in the oilman's lingo. Not the sort
of stuff anyone would pay top dollar for. In fact, Venezuelan crude
generally trades for less than "normal" crude blends --
sometimes upwards of $5 a barrel less. The transport costs of a
45-day sail to China would add another $3 to $4 per barrel -- and
that is assuming China's refineries can even swallow the stuff in
the first place.
China can be
described as aggressive. China can be described as hungry for commodities.
China can even be described as focused on displacing the United
States. But what China cannot be described as is stupid. China will
not pay a premium of nearly $10 a barrel for the privilege of using
the world's most-exposed energy transport route to consume some
of the lowest-quality crude that has ever been discovered.
The only way
China will take delivery of large volumes of Venezuelan crude is
if:
1) Venezuela assists China in revamping its refineries to digest
the stuff;
2) Venezuela buys its own tankers for the long-haul journey;
3) Venezuela pays the entire extra transport cost; and/or
4) Venezuela supplies the crude at a discount commensurate to its
quality.
Taken together,
this means that if Chavez were actually to make good on his promise
to supply China with 1.0 million bpd of crude, he would need to
extend the Chinese a discount in the neighborhood of $8 million
to $9 million a day. That is a very high price for rhetoric. There
is a reason every announcement about the details of this much-vaunted
Chinese-Venezuelan cooperation has come from Chavez and there has
not been so much as a peep from the Chinese.
The one area
in which Chinese-Venezuelan cooperation is likely to blossom is
refining. Most of the world's major oil fields -- and the vast majority
of its high-quality oil fields -- are past maturity. Chinese leaders
are well aware that, as the years grind on, heavier and sourer oil
will become more prevalent in the global crude stream. Despite years
of creeping degradation, Venezuela still commands the technology
to process such materials, and China knows full well that it will
need precisely those skills -- particularly if China is to ultimately
develop reserves of heavy oil just off the mainland's shore. The
desire to master such technologies can neither be quantified nor
ignored.
The government
entity making the most inroads into the world of heavy crude is
the China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC), which boasts a refining
capacity of 2.42 million bpd. That is more than enough to absorb
every drop of crude Venezuela currently exports. But in the meantime,
once CNPC finishes upgrading its refineries it will be happy to
absorb everything Chavez is willing to send -- that is, of course,
assuming Chavez is committed enough to his rhetoric to ship it across
the Pacific free of charge.
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